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Abstract: 
The  transfer  of  rules,  such  as  in  the  European  Union's  recent  enlargements,  requires  well-functioning 
institutions of government as well as societal actors ready to engage with the new rules. Officials of the 
European Commission and other practitioners highlighted the need for both in the run-up to enlargement, 
while critics of the 2004 and 2007 rounds have faulted the state-centric approach employed by the EU for 
undercutting societal actors in the new member states.  
This paper examines data from the World Values Survey and World Bank Governance Indicators and shows 
that state capacity and organized interests do indeed go hand in hand: Among the 27 EU member states, 
countries  that  score  high  on  good  governance  also  have  citizens  engaged  in  interest  organizations, 
volunteering for a broad variety of causes, and ready to participate in acts of protest. By the same token, in 
countries where governments struggle to deliver results, organized interests are insufficiently established and 
rarely in a position to perform governance functions. The data show systematic and statistically significant 
differences between old and new member states, with Eastern Europe lagging behind most of the older 
democracies on both dimensions, i.e. state capacity and civil society. Considerable variation within each block 
does not negate this basic gap. Rather than rely on nonstate actors to compensate for weak institutions of 
government, European policy makers need to invest in long-term efforts to strengthen state institutions and 
bring stakeholders into the processes of policy-making and implementation. 
Keywords: Civil society, state capacity, institutional capacity, governance, political participation, associations, 
European Union enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe, democratization. 
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Introduction 
During the recent accession phases, the European Union presented newly democratizing countries of the 
postcommunist region with oddly contradictory demands: On the one hand, there was the poorly defined 
requirement  to  democratize  all  levels  of  domestic  government,  reinforced  by  a  call  for  stakeholder 
involvement  in  specific  policy  areas,  such  as  environmental  or  employment  and  labor  policy.  The  logic 
underlying this call was either inherent in the policy requirements (e.g. the Social Dialogue) or a recognition 
that externally imposed policies need to be actively „pulled in‟ (Jacoby 1998) by target societies. For its own 
monitoring of candidate country progress toward accession, the Union relied to a considerable extent on non-
state actors for information. On the other hand, the Union pressed the new democracies to streamline their 
legislative procedures and eliminate veto points in order to ensure the speedy transposition of Community 
law,  thereby  cutting  down  on  mechanisms  of  representation.    Often,  therefore,  accession  countries 
transposed via literal translation, sidestepping stakeholder consultation on questions of implementation for 
the sake of expedience.  
 
The incongruity of EU pressures for stakeholder consultation and fast-track harmonization exacerbated two 
widespread accountability problems in the new member states: inadequate performance accountability paired 
with insufficient policy-making accountability (Rose-Ackerman 2007). The first problem refers to the fact that 
lags in state transparency leave citizens and the press poorly equipped to hold governments accountable for 
their actual performance. Insufficient policy-making accountability, meanwhile, is due to the weakness of civil 
societies, as a consequence of which policies and their implementation are less likely to respond to the actual 
needs of the population. Thus, the new member states face the challenge of implementing Community law in 
ways  that  are  meaningful  to  their  own  populations.  Furthermore,  they  find  their  democratic  endeavors 
jeopardized by the complex structure of multilevel and polycentric governance in the EU and weak state 
institutions  at  home  (Zielonka  2007).  Thus  far,  electoral  democracy  at  the  national  level  has  proven 
insufficient  for  establishing  fully  accountable  government  either  nationally  or  within  the  EU;  instead, 
organized interests are needed to improve both accountability and performance in the enlarged EU.  
 
In this paper, I explore the connection between weak state capacity and weak civil society in the EU-25, 
focusing in particular on governance problems within the postcommunist new member states (CEEC10). I 
data from the World Bank‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2006) to document the persistent gap 
between old and new members on six indicators of the quality of governance. Likewise, I show the striking 
east-west disparity on three indicators of civil society, culled from the most recent World Values Survey 
available for the region (2004, data from 1999). Notwithstanding some EU15 outliers (notably Italy and 
Greece), there is a statistically significant difference between EU15 and CEEC10 countries on both state 
capacity and civil society. This gap calls into question not only the functioning of representative democracy 
and EU policy implementation, but also the judicial mode of EU governance, which requires national courts 
and private actors to invoke Union law explicitly in order to operate effectively. I proceed by examining the 
debate  about  the  interaction  between  state  capacity  and  civil  society  in  the  context  of  democracy  and 
European integration. Then I present evidence of the east-west divergence, using multiple indicators for each 
of the two analytical dimensions. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of this gap for European 
governance in the near to medium term.  
 
Interdependence of State Capacity and Civil Society 
“Nothing cripples civil society development like a weak, lethargic state,” asserted Thomas Carothers in a 
critique (1999) of the multifarious uses to which the concept of civil society has been put. Contrary to the Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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reigning wisdom of the 1990s, state socialism left behind weak states that had been captured by the monopoly 
party (Ganev 2001; Goetz and Wollmann 2001; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002). Making matters 
worse, the early transformation period saw foreign advisors and domestic leaders take apart state structures in 
the mistaken belief that the state‟s intrusions into society and the market signaled its strength. International 
financial  institutions  lent  credence  to  this  misperception  and  took  until  the  late  1990s  to  recognize  the 
importance of institutional capacity—secure property relations, macroeconomic stability, tax effectiveness, 
rule  of  law,  infrastructure,  good  public  administrations--for  delivering  the  promises  of  the  market  and 
promoting economic development (EBRD 1999; World Bank 2000a , 2000b, 2002). 
 
By shifting their stance on the significance of good governance, the international financial institutions began 
to signal a recognition that state and society need not cancel each other out and that, in fact, capitalist 
democracies depend on both in order to thrive. This non-zero-sum understanding of state capacity and civil 
society  is  consistent  with  Michael  Mann‟s  concept  of  “infrastructural  power,”  which  enables  the  state 
effectively to implement political decisions primarily by engaging with, rather than coercing, society. Mann 
defines infrastructural power as “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement 
logistically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984, 189). He contrasts infrastructural power 
with “despotic power,” i.e. “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, 
institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups,” characteristic primarily of premodern societies (1984, 
188).  A zero-sum view of civil society and state strength is analytically and normatively inadequate for dealing 
with contemporary industrialized democracies. The state, in order to implement policies, depends both on 
institutional separation from special interests and on linkages between the organizations of society and the 
state.  Likewise,  society  derives  its  influence  not  merely  from  being  separated  from  the  state,  but  from 
engaging  with  it  (Mann  1993,  59;  Hobson  2000,  199-200).  Evans  (1995),  writing  about  less  developed 
countries, expresses a similar idea in his concept of “embedded autonomy”; Weiss (1998) conveys the same 
linkage between the distinct organizational realms of state and society as “governed interdependence.” Tilly 
(2004, 7), less concerned with the policy output of advanced industrialized democracies than with the role of 
contentious politics in the development of democracy, goes a step further. He suggests that increases in the 
state‟s coercive intrusions into society are liable to provoke contentious action on the part of subjects/citizens 
that may help to increase the space for protected state-society consultation, a key feature of democracy. By 
the same token, Tilly argues, expanded consultation tends to raise demands for state intervention and thus for 
increased  government  capacity.  Democracies,  defined  by  relatively  broad  and  equal  citizen  access  to 
government agents, binding consultation, and protection from arbitrary government action, therefore are 
usually associated with high state capacity (Tilly 2004, 35-36). 
 
Democratic  governance  needs  an  active  and  involved  citizenry  capable  of  monitoring  and  opposing 
government policies through collective mobilization and associational representation (Putnam 1993 and 2000, 
Warren 2001). Beyond citizens‟ embrace of attitudes consistent with democracy (Almond and Verba 1965 
and 1980, Inglehart et al. 2002, Norris et al. 2002), democracy depends on citizens‟ active involvement with 
society and the state  (for reviews, see Bernhard and Karakoc ̨ 2007, Howard 2003, Tusalem 2007). Such 
participation  takes  several  forms  beyond  the  mere  casting  of  a  vote,  including  three  that  will  serve  as 
indicators  later  in  this  paper:  membership  in  civic  associations,  unpaid  work  in  civic  associations,  and 
participation in political protest. Nevertheless, the normative role of interactions between civic associations 
and the state is a source of some controversy. As Fung describes the debate (2003), scholars who see civic 
associations primarily as vehicles of socialization in the values of tolerance and generalized reciprocity tend to 
view the activities of the state as separate from the activities of associations (Putnam 2000, Skocpol 2000). Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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They assume a context of mature representative democracy and see little need for associational involvement 
in policy making and implementation.  Their views contrast with those of scholars who emphasize the value 
of  resistance  even  in  advanced  democracies  and  who  favor  more  direct  participation  of  citizens  and 
associations in the tasks of government (Fung 2001, M.R.Warren 2001). Advocates of direct democracy argue 
that  when  associations  replicate  some  of  the  aspects  of  representative  democracy,  such  as  hierarchical 
organization and stratified access to decision-making, their contribution to participatory politics is minimal 
(Fung 2003). But in reality the contrast between participatory and representative functions of associations, 
between resistance to and collaboration with state agents, need not be as stark. Trade unions are notorious 
for their ability to bridge disruptive and collaborative politics, but do not always receive credit as associations 
within the sphere of civil society. Likewise, social movement organizations known for their media-savvy use 
of direct action increasingly exercise the functions of high-level interest representation and consultation with 
government; in settings of multilevel governance such as the EU, they adapt their tactics to the strategic 
opportunities presented in a given political context.1 More generally, in the EU, the functions of lobbying and 
direct action are often blended within the same organizations or divided among organizations within the same 
sector. This fact is poorly addressed by the separate literatures on lobbying, civic associations, and social 
movements, whose normative understandings of democracy diverge.  
 
For the empirical relationship between state capacity and civil society as observed in the E U-25, a third 
dimension may be more relevant than either the socialization effects of civil society or the potential for direct 
democracy. Thus, interest organizations may improve the quality of democratic representation and policy 
deliberation  by  adding  a   functional  dimension  to  an  otherwise  purely  electoral  process.  Functional 
representation is not without its problems, of course; among them are hierarchy, self -selection, and narrow 
interests. But precisely because of their thematic focus, interest organizations may bring a level of expertise to 
policy deliberation that eschews both elected policy -makers and mass electorates .  By emphasizing the 
contributions of organized interests to policy-making and implementation, I wish to neglect neither political 
learning at the individual level nor direct action as useful complement to peak -level policy deliberation. My 
view here is driven by empirical pragmatism rather than a concern with the allegedly conflicting concepts of 
democracy informing different variants of the claim that civil society strengthens governance. For purposes 
of policy deliberation and implementation in adapting EU policies to the realities on the ground, interest 
organizations are indispensible; the potential for direct action in a given socie ty is likely to enhance rather 
than diminish the role of organizational representation. 
 
Interest organizations mediate among citizens, civil society, and the state. Mass membership grants political 
weight to such organizations as they lead societal debate  on emerging issues and challenges, shape public 
opinion, and reflect societal preferences. Intermediary organizations also take on functions for the state, such 
as social services, education, and culture. They evaluate policy-relevant information that feeds into legislative 
processes  and  assists  with  implementation  (Salamon  1995).  Because  intermediary  associations  do  not 
themselves seek political office, they are able to articulate the interests of specific and often marginalized 
societal groups, in marked contrast to political parties, which must appeal to broader audiences and therefore 
simplify and flatten policy discourse. Associations can hold state authorities accountable and enhance the 
transparency  of  administration  (Schmitter  1993).  All  of  these  governance-related  functions  of  interest 
organizations,  furthermore,  are  crucial  in  the  EU,  where  the  “pulling  in”  (Jacoby  2000,  210-211)  of 
supranational rules requires stakeholders and rule entrepreneurs to actively engage with their content at the 
national and subnational level. Further, voluntary associations can defuse ethnic tension and decrease political 
                                                       
1 Examples that come to mind are Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
 
5 
 
violence  (Varshney  2002).  At  the  individual  level,  participation  in  voluntary  associations  assists  political 
learning and conveys skills that facilitate active citizen engagement with institutions of the state. Voluntary 
associations also serve as resources for protest mobilization (Fernandez and McAdam 1989; Leighley 1996; 
McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Oberschall 1973), an equally important form of political participation. Because 
self-reported membership on its own may not be a meaningful indicator of actual participation, I use a second 
associational  indicator,  volunteer  work.  We  can  expect  rates  of  unpaid  associational  work  (active 
membership) to be lower than mere dues-paying (i.e. passive) membership.  
 
Protest  mobilization  has  an  important  agenda-setting  function  in  democracies,  where  it  often  precedes 
interest articulation in more conventional institutional channels. In authoritarian and totalitarian systems, 
protest  can  be  a  vital  catalyst  for  regime  change.  Evidence  from  67  countries  that  underwent  regime 
transitions since 1972 has shown that democratic transitions are much more likely to succeed in the long run 
if they are facilitated by nonviolent civic resistance than if they are elite-brokered (Karatnycky and Ackerman 
2005). It has also been argued that protest can be a functional substitute for bargaining between interest 
organizations  and  the  state.  In  light  of  previous  findings  of  the  weakness  of  civic  associations  in  the 
postcommunist region (note especially Howard 2003), several observers have noted that Eastern European 
political societies evolved much faster than civil society after 1989 (Bunce 2000, Howard 2003). But even if 
this  is  the  case,  parties  lack  mass  membership  (Szczerbiak  2001).  In  the  absence  of  formal  bargaining 
structures between society and the state such as exist both in pluralist and democratic corporatist systems, 
Ekiert  and  Kubik  suggest,  civil  society  resorted  to  sustained  protest  activities,  at  least  in  Poland‟s  early 
transformation period (1989-1993). Greskovits (1998) has made the opposite claim: Eastern Europeans have 
neither joined voluntary associations nor engaged in protest mobilization and have restricted their expression 
of dissent to protest voting.  
 
There are, of course, critics of the argument that civic associations promote democratic governance. First, 
both the content of civic associations‟ activities and the structure of organizational networks seem to matter. 
Berman  (1997)  has  pointed  out  that  Imperial  and  Weimar  Germany  were  extremely  rich  in  voluntary 
associations, but faced a weak political society (political parties and other institutions from which society 
recruits  its  government).2  The combination was   fatal for the Weimar democracy: Associations helped 
fragment German society and further alienated it from political institutions, while at the same time facilitating 
broad recruitment by the Nazi movement. Thus, it is not simply the presence of voluntary  associations that 
helps promote democratic governance, but rather the linkages between civil and political society, as well as 
linkages among social cleavages that voluntary associations may forge (see Bermeo 2000 and Bunce 2000). A 
second and related argument skeptical of the importance of civil society for democratic governance focuses 
on state institutions as the primary agents. Encarnación (2003) argues that effective institutions of governance 
are more important than a rich associational life when it c omes to sustaining democracy. Similarly, Tarrow 
(1996) highlights that political participation often arises in response to the state; thus, civil society forms as a 
result of political party activities. Third, critics who argue that political stability tak es precedence over 
democracy, especially in less developed countries (Huntington 1968, Linz 1978, Valenzuela 2004) , point to 
the  destabilizing  potential  of  civil  society  and  the  fact  that  popular  preferences  may  well  endorse 
                                                       
2 It is useful in this discussion to distinguish civil and political society. Linz and Stepan define civil society as “that arena 
of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to 
articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests (1996, 7). By contrast, political society 
consists  of  “the  core  institutions…  by  which  society  constitutes  itself  politically  to  select  and  monitor  democratic 
government”,  specifically  “political  parties,  elections,  electoral  rules,  political  leadership,  interparty  alliances,  and 
legislatures (1996, 8).  Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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authoritarianism (Brysk 2000, O‟Donnell 1979). Fourth, some critics of associationism as the primary vehicle 
of civil society caution that many nongovernmental organizations receive foreign funds or are even the 
exclusive creation of external actors while lacking roots in domestic society; hence, they are vulnerable to 
cooptation (Mendelson and Glenn 2002). Fifth, associationism as an indicator of civil society has been faulted 
as Western-centric (e.g. Heinrich 2005); it privileges functional trust networks linking society and state actors 
and  devalues  interpersonal  trust  networks  such  as  those  that  may  have  facilitated  survival  under  state 
socialism (e.g. Gibson 2001, Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, Petrova & Tarrow 2007). 
 
Recent large-n quantitative analyses have come to somewhat conflicting conclusions about civil society‟s 
effects on governance. Armony (2004) examined 28 countries from various waves of democratization and 
concluded  that  civil  associations  do  not  increase  government  effectiveness.  Tusalem  (2007)  restricts  his 
analysis to third- and fourth-wave countries to ensure comparability of cases, but has a larger sample of 65 
countries. He focuses on voluntary associations, leaving aside protest mobilization, and includes both pre- 
and post-transition indicators. Tusalem‟s models confirm Putnam‟s positive link between associations and 
good governance. Against the perception that civil society is a path-dependent phenomenon, he also shows 
that for some indicators of governance (rule of law and control of corruption), post-transition associational 
membership is more important than pre -transition societal activism. Bernhard and Karakoc̨ (2007) examine 
the  opposite  causal  question:  Does  previous  regime  type  determine  the  strength  of  civil  society  under 
democracy?  Based  on  42  countries  and  an  operationalization  of  civil  society  that  includes  both 
associationalism  and  protest  mobilization,  they  show  that  previous  totalitarian  (fascist  or  state  socialist) 
regimes retard organizational membership under democracy more than is the case for previous authoritarian 
regimes. On the other hand, the longevity of previous dictatorship, not its authoritarian or totalitarian nature, 
determines protest behavior. They confirm Howard‟s pessimistic conclusions about post-communist civil 
societies and reject Ekiert and Kubik‟s notion that protest substitutes for associationalism in the region. In 
the empirical section, I offer a descriptive analysis of EU15-CEEC10 differences in civil society development 
that largely confirms the findings from Bernhard and Karakoc ̨‟s larger sample. But before that, let me clarify 
why state capacity is so important in the specific EU context. 
 
Why State Capacity Matters in the EU 
European  integration  is  distinct  from  nation-state-making  in  that  it  proceeds  predominantly  through 
regulation and judicial arbitration, leaving traditional activities of the modern state—resource extraction and 
redistribution, internal and external security--mostly in the hands of member countries. For implementation 
and enforcement, the European Union relies on member states and their subnational entities. Thus, the 
Union‟s regulatory and judicial capacity contrasts with its relatively slim administrative apparatus. In this 
sense, the debate over whether European integration strengthens or weakens the state (e.g. Moravcsik 1993) 
is beside the point and imposes an overly simplistic binary opposition. This debate dominated integration 
studies up until the 1990s, when the principal question asked about the European project was whether and 
how member states influenced the Union. Over the last decade, the “Europeanization” debate has turned to 
the question of how the Union affects its members (Börzel and Risse 2000; Cowles et al. 2001; Dyson 2002; 
Falkner et al. 2005; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006; Héritier et al. 2001; Menz 2005; 
Parsons 2007).3 The focus here is on careful empirical  and often sector-specific analysis, in contrast to the 
grand theorizing over constitutional bargains that characterized the intergove rnmentalist-supranationalist 
feuds. Though the overwhelming evidence emerging from the research on the Union‟s effects on member 
                                                       
3 For studies of the Union‟s influence specifically on Eastern Europe, see Albi 2005; Andonova 2004; Haughton 2007; 
Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Sissenich 2007. Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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states points toward cross-national variance rather than convergence, the notion that effective EU policy 
implementation requires state capacity at the national and subnational levels is no longer controversial. 
 
For their part, the old member states recognized the importance of strong administrative institutions for 
prospective members, as evident in the European Council decisions of Madrid in 1995 and Luxembourg in 
1997. These decisions added the criterion of institutional capacity to the previous three Copenhagen (1993) 
criteria of democracy, a competitive market economy, and the ability to fulfill the obligations of membership. 
Though institutional capacity was poorly defined and lacked a basis in Community law, the EU devoted 
preaccession funds to improving CEEC10 bureaucracies. Without clear benchmarks of good governance 
defined at the Community level, the Commission enlisted the expertise of member states, which competed 
for selection by candidate countries to transfer their own models to CEE (Dimitrova 2005; Sissenich 2007). 
The  Commission  examined  implementation  structures  in  its  annual  progress  reports  on  the  candidate 
countries  with  a  view  toward  the  specific  requirements  of  Community  law.  Specific  state-building 
interventions  of  the  EU  in  the  candidate  countries  included  regional  devolution  consistent  with  the 
requirements of the Structural Funds (with very limited success, as Hughes et al. 2005 have shown), the 
creation of new agencies, inter-agency and intra-agency coordination, and changes in budgetary systems and 
financial  control.  Such  efforts  notwithstanding,  a  comparison  of  aggregate  indicators  of  state  capacity 
between old and new member states demonstrates a striking gap, as the next section will show. 
 
Measuring the EU15-CEEC10 Gap in State Capacity 
Though state capacity tends to be policy-specific4, certain prerequisites, such as the rule of law, are  relevant 
regardless of the policy area in question. As evident from what has become the authoritative set of indicators 
of state capacity,  the World Bank‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 1996-2006 (on background 
and methodology, see Kaufmann et al. 2007), CEECs lag behind older member states on all six dimensions of 
governance. Kaufmann and his colleagues have constructed aggregate measures from 33 sources for 212 
countries, based on both elite and mass perceptions of governance, yielding six separate indicators. As the 
authors  warn,  such  aggregate  indicators  produce  large  error  margins  (which,  in contrast  to  other  cross-
country data sets, are actually made explicit), lack the transparency of single surveys, and are ill-suited for 
comparisons across time. Critics have also raised doubts about the undifferentiated nature of each aggregate 
indicator that makes it impossible to distinguish among different manifestations of a given problem; for 
instance, corruption may have different meanings in different contexts and policy responses should take these 
into consideration (Knack 2006; Apaza 2009). Likewise, the WGI have been criticized for bias in favor of 
business interests and for correlations between economic and political indicators (Kurtz and Shrank 2007; 
Arpaza 2009). While such warnings highlight the nature of the WGI as work in progress, the aggregate data 
offer a useful approximation to multi-country comparisons that should be supplemented with more fine-
tuned instruments such as small-N studies. The Governance Indicators do allow for comparisons among 
groups of countries based on a relatively consistent set of measurements.  
 
In figures 1-12, I show the systematic differences between EU15 and CEEC10 in the decade from 1996 to 
2006.5  I present the data in two formats: (1) a time series that traces EU15 and CEEC10 averages on each of 
                                                       
4 See Weiss (1998). Nobody doubts the war-making capacity of, say, the United States, but military prowess does not 
automatically  translate  into  a  heightened  ability  to  create  and  implement  effective  public  health  or  environmental 
policies.  
5 I omit Cyprus and Malta from the analysis because of their size and because they do not share the postcommunist 
legacy of the CEEC10. Their inclusion would risk distorting our findings here. Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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six  indicators  (figures  1-6);  and  (2)  a  country-specific  ten-year  average  for  each  score  that  shows  the 
considerable variance within each bloc, especially the consistently low scores of Greece and Italy (EU15) and 
the  relatively  consistent  high  scores  of  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  and  Slovenia  (CEEC10) 
(figures 7-12). Keep in mind that the time series should not be interpreted as indicative of changes over time 
(Kaufmann et al. 2007); rather, it concerns us here because it demonstrates that the EU15-CEEC10 gap 
persists throughout the decade in question. 
 
The first indicator, “voice and accountability,” measures elements of the political process, civil liberties, 
political rights, and media independence, and thus the quality of democracy (figures 1 and 7). Note that 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia outperform EU15 laggard Greece; Hungary and Slovenia also outperform 
Italy (fig. 7). Second, “political stability” captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
This indicator has seen the greatest convergence between EU15 and CEEC10, such that differences between 
the blocs have not been statistically significant since 2003 (fig. 2). “Government effectiveness”, i.e. “the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment  to  such  policies”  (Kaufmann  et  al.  2007),  has seen some  convergence  between  EU15  and 
CEEC10,  but  differences  remain  statistically  significant  (fig.  3).  On  this  indicator,  Greece  and  Italy  lag 
dramatically behind other EU15 countries, as well as behind the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and 
Slovenia. All other EU15 countries are far ahead of the CEEC10, however (fig. 9). Fourth, “regulatory 
quality” measures the government‟s ability to “formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Differences between EU15 and 
CEEC10 have been statistically significant since 1996 (fig. 4). Estonia is striking as an outlier with a score that 
outperforms seven EU15 countries (fig. 10). Fifth, “rule of law” is an indicator of confidence in rules and 
contract enforcement, as well as in the police, the courts; it also captures perceptions of crime and violence. 
This  is  the  indicator  on  which  EU15-CEEC10  differentials  are  particularly  stark  and  highly  statistically 
significant  (fig.  5),  but  note  again  Greece  and  Italy‟s  distinction  of  lagging  behind  the  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, and Slovenia (fig. 11).  Finally, “control of corruption” measures “extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as „capture‟ of the state 
by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). Differentials between the two blocs are consistent and 
highly statistically significant (fig. 6). Greece and Italy are extreme outliers in the EU15 set and are, once 
again, outperformed by Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia (fig. 12).  
 
Regrettably, the data set does not go back further than 1996; because of that and the inappropriateness of the 
dataset  for  cross-historical  comparisons,  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  trace  the  progress  of  formerly 
authoritarian EU15 countries since their transitions. It is worth noting that Spain and Portugal perform vastly 
better than Greece and Italy on virtually all indicators presented here. The sole exception is political stability, 
where Spain suffers from the persistent separatist conflict in the Basque region. Pessimistic determinism 
about the CEEC10‟s potential to strengthen their state institutions over the next couple of decades would 
therefore be misplaced. On the other hand, whereas the EU15 may have functioned reasonably well with two 
governance underperformers in its midst, it is less clear how an ever more highly regulated Union can operate 
when nearly half its members struggle with the tasks of government. One challenge that already surfaced 
during accession preparation, but is magnified by the much larger transfers post-accession, is the region‟s 
capacity to absorb the considerable amounts of money transferred from EU coffers. Ironically, though all 
CEEC10 states will benefit from such transfers, it is the economic and administrative leaders within the bloc Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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that will best be able to put these additional resources to good use, while Romania and Bulgaria are likely to 
lack  the  means  to  fully  claim  the  EU  funds.  Another  problem  with  weak  governance  is  the  full 
implementation of Community law, which requires not only state institutions, but also active citizens and 
interest groups willing and able to capitalize on new political opportunity structures and engage with the new 
rules and institutions. Let us now turn to civil society and its role in democratic governance. 
 
Measuring the EU15-CEEC10 Gap in Civil Society 
The World Values Survey is one of the most extensive data sets on mass political attitudes and political 
behaviors, now in its 4th wave, but unfortunately the relevant country data on civil society and political 
participation are a decade old. I rely on the 2004 round, with data collected in 1999/2000 (World Values 
Survey 2004). Like Bernhard and Karakoc̨ (2007), I use associational membership and protest activities as 
indicators  of  civil  society  development,  but  I  add  a  third  indicator,  volunteer  work,  arguably  a  more 
meaningful measure of active civic participation than mere organizational membership. I show that CEE lags 
behind the EU15 region on all three (consistent with Howard 2003 on postcommunist Europe). Though I do 
not show the results here, the WVS findings on protest mobilization, as captured in 1999/2000, mirror those 
of a different dataset, the European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003, 2005, 2007), which does not cover all 
EU25 countries but has more recent data than the WVS.6  
 
Figure 13 shows cross-country differences in the average number of organizational memberships per person. The 
organizations range widely from churches, labor unions and parties to sports and cultural associations. Several 
points are worth mentioning:  
1.  In CEE, there are basically two groups of countries—one made up of seven that score below the 
CEEC10 average, the other a vanguard of three countries that score higher than a number of 
EU15  countries.  Thus,  Slovenia,  the  Czech  Republic,  and  Slovakia  seem  fundamentally 
comparable  to  the  bottom  half  of  EU15  countries.  Note  that  this  vanguard  includes  two 
countries whose experience with communism was one of a relatively closed system until the very 
end in 1989 (Czech Republic and Slovakia). By the same token, two countries that experienced 
considerable mobilization during the communist years—Poland and Hungary—count among the 
laggards in associational memberships. These findings suggest that we should be careful not to 
infer too much determinism when discussing communist legacies in the region. 
2.   Second, among the EU15 we can distinguish three clusters: a bottom cluster with scores similar 
to the CEEC10, which includes countries with authoritarian or totalitarian legacies (Portugal, 
Spain, Germany, and Italy), but also the older democracies of France and UK; a middle cluster of 
seven that scores around the EU15 mean; and a top cluster of two with exceptionally high 
membership scores (Netherlands and Sweden).  
3.  Despite some overlap between CEEC10 and EU15 scores, the differences between the two 
blocs are statistically significant and the EU15 mean is more than double the CEEC10 mean.  
4.  That said, differences within each country are very high and create large standard deviations.  
When  it  comes  to  volunteering,  the  differences  between  CEEC10  and  EU15  become  weaker,  but  remain 
statistically significant. Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic score at or above the EU25 mean. Portugal, 
Germany and Spain score below the CEEC10 mean (figure 14).  
                                                       
6 The European Social Survey prompts for similar political activities as the WVS, but is not exactly interchangeable in its 
questions. On seven indicators of political participation (working for a party, working for a non-party organization, 
wearing a political badge, boycotting a product, contacting a politician, and participating in a legal demonstration), 
CEEC10 scores are significantly lower than EU15 scores throughout three rounds of interviewing (2002, 2004, 2006). Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Moving on to protest mobilization as reflected in figure 15, average protest actions per person and country, we 
can observe similar patterns: 
1.  Among the CEEC10, we  can again distinguish three clusters: Romania as a bottom outlier, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic as the top outliers, and seven countries that cluster around the 
CEEC10 mean.  
2.  Among  the  EU15,  there  is  one  bottom  outlier  (Spain)  and  one  top  outlier  (Sweden).  The 
remaining  thirteen  countries  can  be  divided  into  those  that  score  above  the  EU15  mean 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  Netherlands,  and  France)  and  those  that  score  below  (the 
remaining eight).  
3.  The differences between EU15 and CEEC10 are highly statistically significant at the .0001 level.  
4.   Finally, the standard deviations are again very high based on large within-country differences. 
 
Documenting the Correlation between State Capacity and Civil Society 
Table 1 shows Pearson correlations for civil society and governance scores. Not surprisingly, the governance 
scores  are  all  highly  correlated  with  one  another.  The  same  is  true  for  organizational  membership  and 
volunteer work. But two things are worth emphasizing: First, the Pearson coefficients here confirm previous 
findings in the literature that membership and volunteer work in associations of any stripe makes people 
more likely to participate in protest events and thus be active and engaged citizens (the correlation between 
organizational  membership  and  protest  is  .72  and  highly  statistically  significant).  Second,  and  most 
importantly, good governance and civil society do indeed go together. Strikingly, the correlations between 
governance, on the one hand, and protest activity on the other, tend to be as strong as, or stronger than, for 
mere organizational membership. In other words, not only is protest mobilization not destabilizing, but it is 
associated  with  greater  political  stability,  government  effectiveness,  regulatory  quality,  rule  of  law,  and 
corruption control. The correlations do not allow us to speculate about causal direction, of course. But the 
take-away value of this analysis should be that strong states and strong civil societies go hand in hand. 
 
Figure 16 summarizes the findings on cumulative state capacity and civil society by means of a scatterplot. 
With a few exceptions, postsocialist countries are located in the lower left quadrant and EU15 states in the 
upper right quadrant formed by the respective EU25 means. Exceptions are Portugal, Spain, and Germany, 
which score relatively higher on state capacity than on civil society and thus find themselves in the upper left 
quadrant, and Greece, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which score relatively higher on civil society than on 
state capacity.  
 
Conclusion 
In order to operate effectively, Community law must be implemented by well-functioning institutions at the 
national  and  subnational  levels  of  government.  Strong  systems  of  national  administration  are  not  only 
perfectly compatible with European integration, but are in fact essential. Just as important, however, is that 
stakeholders deal with the new rules. This is true at the policy-making stage, of course, but I argue it is also 
true at the transposition and implementation stages. Community law must be the target of citizen deliberation 
and activism. Regardless of whether citizens come to embrace or battle a particular Community rule as the 
result of such deliberation, this active engagement is necessary in order to give the law meaning within the 
national context. I have shown elsewhere that even when Community rules call for stakeholder involvement, 
as is the case with the Social Dialogue and EU employment policy, they can fall flat if the actors in question 
to not take possession of such new political opportunities (Sissenich 2007). Even the effectiveness of the Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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European Court of Justice ultimately depends on stakeholders at the national level who are resourceful 
enough to invoke Community law, just as it depends on the willingness of national courts to refer cases to the 
ECJ.  
 
In light of these arguments, the findings presented here should cause us to reflect on the medium-term 
prospects of governance within the EU. No doubt the democratic and capitalist transformation processes 
were accelerated thanks to EU pressure (Vachudova 2005). But the cases of Italy and Greece, both of which 
score consistently low on governance, raise the question of the EU‟s ability to streamline institutional capacity 
among its members. The findings of EU15-CEEC10 differences that this paper presents add to a growing 
chorus on the long-term effects of communist and other dictatorial legacies (see Bernhard and Karakoc̨ 2007 
and Howard 2003 for examples). The existence of high achievers among the CEEC10 and low achievers 
among the EU15 cannot disguise the persistent east-west gap on both governance and civil society. 
 
Despite the high correlations between governance and civil society score, one question that this paper has left 
unexplored is the relative importance of each for purposes of EU governance. In this context, what are we to 
make of cases that score high on one dimension but low on the other? Italians and Greeks are a contentious 
bunch, as the protest data reveal, but struggle with ineffective state institutions. Hungarians and Estonians 
appear as relatively unengaged in civil society, but feature impressive institutional capacity. For ensuring the 
effectiveness of Community law, the latter two cases seem more promising than the former, suggesting that 
what ultimately counts is good governance. But the data presented here also indicate that citizen activism 
might improve institutional capacity.  
 Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Figures 1-6: WGI differences between EU15 and CEEC10 Note that the WGI data are not fit for cross-historical 
comparison; instead, the graphs illustrate the persistent east-west gap in governance. 
Figure 1: Voice and Accountability, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 
 
 Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). All indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher 
values indicating better outcomes. All EU15-CEEC10 differences are statistically significant (2-tailed t-test) at 
the .0001 level.  
 
Figure 2: Political Stability, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 
 
  
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). Since 2003, EU15-CEEC10 differentials have not 
been statistically significant (2-tailed t-test). Prior to that, there were statistically significant differences in 1996 
(.01 level), 1998 (.01 level), 2000 (.0001 level), and 2002 (.05 level).  Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Figure 3: Government Effectiveness, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 
  
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank).  All EU15-CEEC10 differentials are statistically 
significant at the .0001 level, except for 2006, which is statistically significant at the .001 level (2-tailed t-test). 
 
Figure 4: Regulatory Quality, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). All EU15-CEEC10 differentials are statistically 
significant (2-tailed t-test) at the .01 level (1996, 1998, 2005, 2006) or the .001 level (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
Figure 5: Rule of Law, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). All EU15-CEEC10 differentials are highly 
statistically significant (2-tailed t-test) at the .0001 level. 
 
Figure 6: Control of Corruption, EU15 vs CEEC10, 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). All EU15-CEEC10 differentials are highly 
statistically significant at the .0001 level (2-tailed t-test). 
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Figure 7: Average Voice and Accountability by Country, 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Figure 8: Average Political Stability by Country, 1996 - 2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). 
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Figure 9: Average Government Effectiveness by Country 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). 
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Figure 10: Average Regulatory Quality by Country, 1996-
2006
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). 
 
 
 
 
 Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
 
19 
 
Figure 11: Average Rule of Law by Country, 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Figure 12: Average Control of Corruption by Country, 1996-2006 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank). 
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Figure 13: Average Number of Organizational Memberships per Person and Country 
 
Source: EVS/WVS 2004. Year of survey: 1999 (Finland: 2000). N=32251. Question: “Please look carefully at the following list of 
voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?” Organizations included: welfare, religious, education 
and cultural, labor, political parties, local political actions, human rights, environment, professional associations, youth work, sports 
and recreation, women's groups, peace movement, health, consumer rights, other. Coded as 1 = “belong”, 0 = other. Cumulative 
score computed by summing binary scores across all sixteen categories of organizational membership. The differences between EU15 
and CEEC10 are statistically significant (.01 level, 2-tailed t-test).  Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Figure 14: Volunteer Work per Person and Country 
 
Source: EVS/WVS 2004. N=32251.  Question: “And for which [organizations], if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary 
work?” Organizations included: welfare, religious, education and cultural, labor, political parties, local political actions, human rights, 
environment,  professional associations, youth work,  sports and recreation, women's groups, peace  movement,  health,  consumer 
rights, other. Coded as 1 = “belong”, 0 = other. Cumulative score computed by summing binary scores across all sixteen categories of 
volunteer work. The differences between EU15 and CEEC10 are statistically significant (.05 level, 2-tailed t-test). 
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Figure 15: Average Protest Actions per Person and Country 
 
 
Source: EVS/WVS 2004. N=3 2251.  Question: “Now I‟d like you to look at this card. I‟m going to read out some different forms of 
political action that people can take, and I‟d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, 
whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it.” The data were recoded as follows: 1 = have done; 0 = other. 
Cumulative score calculated by adding the binary values of five forms of protest action (petitions, boycotts, lawful demonstrations, 
unlawful strikes, building occupations). The differences between EU15 and CEEC10 are statistically significant (.0001 level, 2-tailed t-
test). Sissenich: Weak States, Weak Societies 
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Table 1: Correlations among and between State Capacity and Civil Society Indicators 
 
 
  Political 
Action  Volunteer Work 
Organizational 
Membership  
Voice & 
Accountability   Political Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality  Rule of Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Political Action                   
Volunteer Work  .757**                 
Organizational Membership  .717**  .859**               
Voice and Accountability  .609**  .453*  .653**             
Political Stability  .339  .435*  .621**  .788**           
Government Effectiveness  .668**  .490*  .674**  .954**  .744**         
Regulatory Quality  .497*  .419*  .588**  .897**  .794**  .930**       
Rule of law  .653**  .454*  .644**  .959**  .756**  .988**  .913**     
Control of Corruption  .628**  .457*  .668**  .941**  .738**  .977**  .893**  .987**   
               
               
N = 25. **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Figure 16: Scatterplot of Cumulative State Capacity and Cumulative Civil Society 
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